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GETTING THE WORD OUT ABOUT FRAUD:
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF
WHISTLEBLOWING AND INSIDER TRADING
Jonathan Macey*
The purpose of this Article is to show that corporate whistleblowing
is not analytically or functionally distinguishable from insider trad-
ing when such trading is based on "whistleblower information,"
that is, the information a whistleblower might disclose to the au-
thorities. In certain contexts, both insider trading and
whistleblowing, if incentivized, would reduce the incidence of cor-
porate pathologies such as fraud and corruption. In light of this
analysis, it is peculiar that whistleblowing is encouraged and pro-
tected, while insider trading on whistleblower information is not
only discouraged but criminalized. Often, insider trading will be far
more effective than whistleblowing at bringing fraud and corrup-
tion to light, both because insider trading is more credible and
because it does not depend on the efficiency of government actors.
Whistleblowing and insider trading on whistleblower information,
however, are different from blackmail, which also involves informa-
tion about a third party's illicit conduct. While both whistleblowing
and insider trading on whistleblower information should be en-
couraged, blackmail should be prohibited because it impedes the
discovery of fraud and corruption. Finally, despite the theoretical
similarities between whistleblowing and insider trading, there are
some important practical differences in the ways that whistleblow-
ing and insider trading affect markets, indicating that these
activities are complements rather than substitutes in the fight
against fraud and corruption.
* Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Securities Law and Corporate Finance, Yale
University. I am grateful for comments from Bruce Ackerman, Ian Ayres, Henry Hansmann, Oona
Hathaway, Al Klevorick, Henry Manne, Dan Markovitz, and Geoffrey Miller; and from participants
in the Harvard Law School Workshop in Law and Economics and the Yale Law School Faculty
Workshop. Stephanie Biedermann, Sachin Shivaram, and Johanna Spellman, Yale Law School class
of 2007, and Robin Preussel, Yale Law School class of 2006, provided valuable research assistance.
1899
Michigan Law Review
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODUCTION .................................................................................... 190 1
I. DEFINING WHISTLEBLOWING ................................................ 1903
A. Our Venerable Tradition of
Compensating Whistleblowers ........................................ 1904
B. Self-Interested Behavior and Whistleblowing ................. 1907
1. Sherron Watkins-A Paradigmatic
W histleblow er? ......................................................... 1907
2. Analyzing Sherron Watkins'Actions .......................... 1909
II. INSIDER TRADING AS WHISTLEBLOWING ............................... 1910
A . D irks v. SE C .................................................................... 1913
B. Lessons from D irks .......................................................... 1914
III. INSIDER TRADING AND WHISTLEBLOWING: IS THE
COMBINATION THE NORM? .................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1915
IV. CREDIBILITY, PAYOFFS AND RELIANCE ON OTHER
MECHANISMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ......................... 1917
A. The Failure of External Corporate
Governance Mechanisms ................................................ 1917
B. The Failure of the Media to Expose Corporate Fraud .... 1918
C. Whistleblowers'Failure to Communicate ........................ 1919
D. The Effects of These Failures on Whistleblowing:
The Relative Payoffs of Whistleblowing
and Insider Trading ......................................................... 1920
V. INSIDER TRADING, WHISTLEBLOWING,
PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND LAW ................................................ 1921
A. The Law of Insider Trading and Its Foundations
in Property Rights ............................................................ 1921
B. Legal Lessons for Trading on Whistleblower
Information: Creating Incentives .................................... 1922
C. What Kind of Information Qualifies as
Whistleblower Information? ............................................ 1924
VI. WHISTLEBLOWERS AND INSIDER TRADING:
SOME D IFFERENCES ................................................................ 1927
A. The Need for Public Securities Markets .......................... 1927
B. The Tim ing Problem ........................................................ 1928
VII. WHO PAYS FOR WHISTLEBLOWING AND INSIDER TRADING:
FAIRNESS WORRIES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES ................. 1929
A . Fairn ess ........................................................................... 1929
B. Distributional Concerns .................................................. 1932
VIII. WHISTLEBLOWING AND INSIDER TRADING: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND CONTRACTING ISSUES ............................. 1935
IX. WHISTLEBLOWING AND INSIDER TRADING ARE
N OT BLACKM AIL .................................................................... 1938
C ONCLU SION ....................................................................................... 1939
1900 [Vol. 105:1899
Getting the Word Out about Fraud
INTRODUCTION
Over the past five years, it appears that whistleblowing has become fash-
ionable. Whistleblowers, who traditionally have been considered tattletales
and otherwise viewed with suspicion,' have recently enjoyed a distinct rise
in popularity. As Salon observed not long ago:
In recent years, aided in part by movies like "The Insider" whistle-blowers
have attained the status of folk heroes. "It's become popular to protect
whistle-blowers-that's never happened before" says Danielle Brian, ex-
ecutive director of the Project on Government Oversight, a nonprofit
public interest group dedicated to exposing governmental corruption and
mismanagement that works closely with whistle-blowers and that advo-
cates for them.2
Time magazine called 2002 "The Year of the Whistleblower," honoring
"inside do-gooders who risked their careers" 3 to expose, among other things,
how the FBI lost a key terrorism suspect before the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, and how Enron misled investors through phony accounting
treatment of off-balance sheet transactions. There is even a National Whis-
tleblower Center, a nonprofit group dedicated to helping whistleblowers in
their efforts "to improve environmental protection, nuclear safety, and gov-
emnment and corporate accountability.
4
It is still probably the case that whistleblowing is "a form of organiza-
tional dissent."5 But the recent positive publicity for whistleblowers suggests
that whistleblowing is now viewed with less suspicion-and whistleblowers
as less politically motivated and more altruistic-than was true in the past.
Whistleblowers are now thought of as an integral component of the recently
re-regulated system of corporate governance that is supposed to result in
1. In the past whistleblowing was viewed as radical and vaguely subversive, if not down-
right disloyal and unpatriotic. See, e.g., FREDERICK ELLISTON ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWING.
MANAGING DISSENT IN THE WORKPLACE (1985); DAVID W. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE ORGANI-
ZATION: BRINGING CIVIL LIBERTIES TO THE WORKPLACE (1977); WHISTLEBLOWING: SUBVERSION
OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? (Gerald Vinten ed., 1994); Frederick A. Elliston, Civil Disobedience
and Whistleblowing: A Comparative Appraisal of Two Forms of Dissent, 1 J. Bus. ETHICS 23
(1982); Brian Martin, Whistleblowing and Nonviolence, 24 PEACE & CHANGE 15 (1999); Joyce
Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistleblowing as Resistance in Modern Work Organizations: The
Politics of Revealing Organizational Deception and Abuse, in RESISTANCE AND POWER IN ORGANI-
ZATIONS 252-73 (John M. Jennier et al. eds., 1994).
2. Eric Boehlert, The Betrayal of the Whistle-blowers, SALON, Oct. 21, 2003, http://
dir.salon.comlstory/news/featurel2003/10/2 1/whistleblower/index.html.
3. Id.
4. For information about the National Whistleblower Center, see About NWC,
http://www.whistleblowers.org/html/aboutnwc.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) ("The primary goal
of the Center is to ensure that disclosures about government or industry actions that violate the law
or harm the environment are fully heard, and that the whistleblowers who risk their careers to ex-
pose wrongdoing are defended. The Center's mission is to strengthen the rights of whistleblowers
and to help make their underlying claims known to the public in order to safeguard the welfare of
the American people").
5. Brian Martin & Will Rifkin, The Dynamics of Employee Dissent: Whistleblowers and
Organizational Jiu-Jitsu, 4 PUB. ORG. REV. 221, 221 (2004).
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better monitoring and control of managerial misconduct (agency costs) in
large, publicly held corporations.6 Tip-offs from insiders have been de-
scribed as "by far the most common method of detecting fraud. 7
The purpose of this Article is to suggest that whistleblowing and one
particular kind of insider trading-namely insider trading on the basis of
information about corporate corruption, corporate fraud or other illegal cor-
porate conduct-are analytically and functionally indistinguishable as
responses to corporate pathologies such as fraud and corruption. This, in
turn, explains why whistleblowers are sometimes viewed with suspicion and
distrust, not only by their colleagues but also by regulators and journalists.
When giant businesses like Enron, Adelphia, or WorldCom are brought
to their knees by whistleblowers, innocent people are harmed. The innocent
employees, small suppliers, local communities, and philanthropic organiza-
tions that depended on these firms suffer as much, if not more, than the
firm's largely diversified investor base. These groups single out the whistle-
blower as the source of their trouble. Revelations by whistleblowers can be
embarrassing to regulators, prosecutors, and others who are supposed to be
alert for fraudulent corporate activity.
Conversely, it also is the case that inside traders sometimes have fared
surprisingly well in the courts. In particular, in cases where insider trading
leads to the same revelations about incipient fraud as whistleblowing would,
courts can be remarkably accepting of such trading.8
In this Article, I advance the theory that both whistleblowing and insider
trading are best analyzed as involving rights in the same inchoate intellec-
tual property: valuable information. Whether one has the right to blow the
whistle on somebody else and whether one has the right to trade on the basis
of nonpublic information ultimately depends on whether the person engag-
ing in the conduct has a rightful property interest in the information he or
she is using. If so, then the conduct, whether characterized as whistleblow-
ing or insider trading, should be not only legally permissible, but
affirmatively encouraged. By contrast, in situations where the person doing
the trading or the whistleblowing has no legitimate property interest in the
information, the behavior should be illegal.
6. The centerpiece of the new corporate governance regime is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29
U.S.C. (Supp. III 2003)). This bill contains significant protections for private sector whistleblowers.
See infra text accompanying notes 108-115. Upon signing the bill into law, President George W.
Bush observed that "today I sign the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since
the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt .... This law says to every dishonest corporate leader: 'You
will be exposed and punished. The era of low standards and false profits is over. No boardroom in
America is above or beyond the law.'" George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (July 30, 2002), in 38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1283, 1284 (Aug. 5, 2002).
7. A Price Worth Paying?, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 71, available at http://
www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?storyid=3984019.
8. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (finding that petitioner had not violated antifraud
provisions of securities laws by sharing inside information obtained from a tipper whose purpose
was to expose fraud).
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Part I offers a definition of whistleblowing and a history of the gov-
ernment's efforts to encourage the practice, including an analysis of
perhaps the most famous case of whistleblowing: Sherron Watkins and
Enron. Part II compares insider trading and whistleblowing. This compari-
son explains the traditional antipathy and suspicion toward
whistleblowers. In Part III, I explore whistleblowing and insider trading as
phenomena that often occur in tandem. Part IV demonstrates why whistle-
blowers lack credibility and explains that verifying the assertions of
nontrading whistleblowers is likely to be very costly. In Part V, I discuss
the implications of a property-rights regime for insider trading and whis-
tleblowing, as well as the legal regimes dealing with each. I then show
how insider trading on negative information, when properly regulated, is a
superior substitute for whistleblowing. The argument here is not that in-
sider trading should be generally permitted or that such trading is
universally beneficial to shareholders, companies, or society. Rather, the
argument is that the limited and tightly regulated ability to "sell short" can
credibly signal to the market that the trader has negative information about9
a company. Part VI considers why, in light of this analysis, we observe
such radically different treatment of whistleblowers and inside traders. In
Part VII, I look at the distributional concerns of insider trading and of
whistleblowing for the investors of a company, exploring who actually
pays for these practices and their effects on the company. Part VIII ex-
plains why the private contracting process within firms is not likely to
permit the sort of trading advocated here, thereby making it necessary to
accomplish the result by regulation rather than by intrafirm contracting.
Part IX briefly discusses blackmail as a method for reacting to confidential
or secretive information about corporate fraud and compares this reaction
to that of whistleblowing and insider trading.
I. DEFINING WHISTLEBLOWING
A whistleblower is an employee or other person in a contractual
relationship with a company who reports misconduct to outside firms or
institutions, which in turn have the authority to impose sanctions or take
other corrective action against the wrongdoers.' ° While some definitions of
whistleblowing require that the misconduct be reported to people outside the
organization, other definitions also include reporting misconduct up the
chain of command within an organization."' Where one is blowing the
9. Selling short involves selling shares that one does not own with the intention of profiting
by "covering the short position:' which entails buying the shares more cheaply in the future when
the price declines.
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (8th ed. 2004) (defining whistleblower as "[a]n em-
ployee who reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement agency"); John A.
Gray, Is Whistleblowing Protection Available Under Title IX?: An Hertmeneutical Divide and the
Role of Courts, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 671, 671 (2006).
It. For example, whistleblowing has been defined in one statute as conduct that involves
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whistle against an entire way of doing business or against people at or near
the very top of a company, as was the case with Enron, reporting the
behavior up the chain of command is not actually whistleblowing. After all,
it is hardly whistleblowing to report misconduct to the very people engaged
in the misconduct. But where the misconduct involved is that committed by
public officials, instead of individuals in the private sector, disclosure to
those outside the organization may constitute a crime if the information is
classified pursuant to administrative action or subject to an executive order
of confidentiality.12
A. Our Venerable Tradition of Compensating Whistleblowers
The origins of whistleblowing legislation in the United States can be
traced to the False Claims Act, enacted in 1863 to reduce the incidence of
fraud among the suppliers of munitions and other war materials to the Union
government during the Civil War. 3 Significantly, the act authorizes pay-
ments to whistleblowers of a percentage of any money recovered or
damages won by the government in cases of fraud that the whistleblower's
evidence helped expose.1 4 The act allows whistleblowers, called "relators,"
to bring qui tam actions on behalf of the government against those alleged to
have submitted false claims to the government. 5 As with modern whistle-
blower statutes, the False Claims Act also protects whistleblowers from
wrongful dismissal.1
6
The False Claims Act was not widely utilized until far-reaching amend-
ments to the act in 1986 made it an attractive weapon to combat fraud in
disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or applicant rea-
sonably believes evidences-
(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety,
if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifi-
cally required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the
conduct of foreign affairs.
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2000); see generally C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN
LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POWER (2001).
12. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2000) (allowing personnel action if disclosed information
is prohibited by law or required by Executive order to be kept secret).
13. False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 698 (1863) (current provisions contained in 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-3731 (2000)).
14. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2000).
15. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). "Qui tam" is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase "qui tam pro dom-
ino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means "who brings action for the king as
well as himself." Qui tam actions date back to at least the fourteenth century. Vermont Agency of
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000) (citing Prior of Lewes v. De
Holt (1300), reprinted in 48 SELDEN SOCIETY 198 (1931)).
16. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000).
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virtually any program involving federal funds. 7 Although originally in-
tended to deter the submission of fraudulent invoices by defense contractors,
the False Claims Act now covers every industry that deals with the federal
government. 8 The act provides for whistleblowers to be reinstated to their
jobs with seniority, double back pay, interest on back pay, compensation for
discriminatory treatment, and legal fees.' 9 Additional federal legislation bars
reprisals against those who expose government corruption.20
Congress adopted further whistleblower protection for public employees
in 1989 when it passed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989
("WPA"). 2' The WPA is an anti-retaliation statute that prohibits the federal
government from retaliating against employees who blow the whistle on
public sector misconduct and that provides a means of redress for employ-
ees.2 2 The Office of the Special Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection
Board are charged with upholding the WPA.2 3 Employees can obtain protec-
tion as whistleblowers either by making disclosure to a special counsel, the
inspector general of an agency, another employee designated by an agency
24head to receive such disclosures, or to any other individual or organization.
Thus, employees who work for companies that deal with the government
or who are themselves in government jobs have incentives to disregard
internal channels, such as the internal audit function, and file whistleblower
actions in court. The so-called "qui tam" provision of the federal False
Claims Act enables an individual with knowledge that someone has filed a
false claim involving payment by the government to file a qui tam action in
2-5court. When such an action is filed, the government takes responsibility for
26,investigating the allegation.
Where the fraud is successfully prosecuted, the whistleblower is eligible
to receive a bounty of at least fifteen percent of the final recovery,27 which
for large frauds can amount to tens of millions of dollars merely for having
brought a false claim to the government's attention. The burden of proving
17. Pub. L. No. 99-562, §§ 3,4, 100 Stat. 3154 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (2000)).
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
19. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2000). Harassment and dismissal of whistleblowers and the reve-
lation of widespread waste and fraud in defense contracting led Congress to strengthen the position
of whistleblowers in 1989. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 32
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1219, 1221, 1222, 3352 (2000)).
21. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 32 (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 1211-1219, 1221, 1222,3352(2000)).
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1213, 1214 (2000).
23. Id. §§ 1212, 1214.
24. Id. § 1213(a)(2).
25. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
1905June 2007]
Michigan Law Review
the false claim must be met by the government: "[tJhe whistleblower has to
do nothing other than file the qui tam action."28
Thus, while it is tempting to distinguish whistleblowing from insider
trading on the grounds that the motivations of whistleblowers are more
"pure," this does not appear to be the case. Here the point is not that inside
traders are particularly virtuous. Of course they aren't. Rather the point is
that whistleblowers are often motivated by the financial returns associated
with whistleblowing in the same way that inside traders are motivated by the
financial returns associated with trading. Consistent with this intuition, the
federal statutes regulating whistleblowing for public corruption are specifi-
cally designed to provide economic incentives for whistleblowers. And at
least some whistleblowers have profited richly from qui tam actions. In the
fiscal year 2005, for example, federal whistleblowers were awarded $166
29
million, up from $108 million in 2004. In one particular case, the various
government settlements from the myriad investigations into HealthSouth
Corporation's alleged fraud against Medicare and other federally-insured
health care programs yielded $327 million in fines payable to the U.S. gov-
30
emnment. Of this amount, $76 million in recoveries was attributable to four
qui tam law suits.3 Five relators received $12.6 million for their contribu-
tions to the HealthSouth litigation.2 More generally, recoveries resulting
from all qui tam and non-qui tam cases brought under the False Claims Act
from 1986 to 2004 total $13.5 billion.33 Whistleblower rewards for qui tam
cases exceeded $1.4 billion during this period.34
28. Jonathan Figg, Whistleblowing, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Apr. 2000, at 30, 36.
29. Press Release 05-595, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $1.4 Billion in
Fraud & False Claims in Fiscal Year 2005; More Than $15 Billion Since 1986, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/November/05_civ 595.html [hereinafter Press Release 05-595];
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics-Overview, October 1, 1986-September 30,
2004 (Mar. 4, 2005), [hereinafter Fraud Statistics--Overview].
30. Press Release 05-595, supra note 29. In that case, the government alleged as follows:
HealthSouth, the nation's largest provider of rehabilitative medicine services, engaged in three
major schemes to defraud the government. The first, comprising $170 million of the settlement
amount, resolved Health South's [sic] alleged false claims for outpatient physical therapy ser-
vices that were not properly supported by certified plans of care, administered by licensed
physical therapists or for one-on-one therapy as represented. Another $65 million resolved
claims that HealthSouth engaged in accounting fraud which resulted in overbilling Medicare
on hospital cost reports and home office cost statements. The remaining $92 million resolved
allegations of billing Medicare for a range of unallowable costs, such as lavish entertainment
and travel expenses incurred for HealthSouth's annual administrators' meeting at Disney
World, and other claims. Government-initiated claims accounted for $251 million of the set-
tlement amount, with the remaining $76 million attributable to four qui tam law suits.
Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Fraud Statistics--Overview, supra note 29.
34. Id.
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B. Self-Interested Behavior and Whistleblowing
As noted above, a whistleblower is someone who observes criminal be-
havior and alerts a competent authority. The term naturally conjures up
images of concerned citizens frantically blowing whistles to thwart mug-
gings and bank robberies on Main Street, U.S.A.35 Yet even where
whistleblowers do not engage in whistleblowing for money, there often are
other self-interested motivations behind this ostensibly altruistic behavior.
Disgruntled employees are more likely to engage in whistleblowing than
other employees, and revenge is often a common feature in whistleblower36
cases. Thus, it does not appear possible to distinguish whistleblowing from
insider trading by portraying whistleblowers as wholly altruistically
motivated in contrast to inside traders.37
1. Sherron Watkins-A Paradigmatic Whistleblower?
Sherron Watkins, the iconic whistleblower, does not remotely fit the tra-
• 31
ditional definition and imagery associated with a whistleblower. She did
write a memorandum articulating some of her concerns about the "suspi-
cions of accounting improprieties" at Enron. 9 But she gave this document to
the company's then-CEO, Kenneth Lay, later a criminal defendant in various
fraud and insider trading cases related to Enron's collapse.4 Then, on the
basis of Lay's vague assurances that he would look into the wrongdoing, she
did nothing; her memorandum was not made public until congressional in-
vestigators released it six weeks after Enron filed for bankruptcy-long after
the company and its stock price had collapsed.4'
Critical to understanding Ms. Watkins's role as a self-interested whistle-
blower is understanding her objectives in writing the whistleblower letter. To
do this, it is necessary to parse the letter that Watkins anonymously e-mailed
to Lay. The opening line makes it clear that Watkins's objective is to retain
35. Dan Ackman, Sherron Watkins Had Whistle, but Blew It, FORBES.COM, Feb. 14, 2002,
http://www.forbes.com/2002/02/14/0214watkins.html.
36. See William De Maria, The Victorian Whistleblower Protection Act: Patting the Paws of
Corruption 13 (May 3, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("[Ilnformants disclose
important and socially useful information for all sorts of reasons ([e.g.,] revenge)..."), available at
http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/dissent/documents/DeMariaViclaw.pdf.
37. Although there is a potential financial benefit to whistleblowing, it is generally difficult
to demonstrate that such financial benefit is the primary motivating factor rather than just a
contributing one. By contrast, in the case of insider trading, the primary motivation often is to profit
from the inside information. Highlighting wrongdoing may merely be a fringe benefit. It does
appear, however, to be naive to assume that whistleblowers are altruistic or that they as a group have
a "moral edge" on inside traders.
38. See Ackman, supra note 35. Besides being hailed as one of Time magazine's People of
the Year in 2002, a reporter once observed that Watkins "has been hailed as a whistle-blower so
often it's starting to sound like part of her name.' Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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her employment and to protect her pension savings. The Watkins letter be-
gins by asking, "Has Enron become a risky place to work? For those of us
who didn't get rich over the last few years, can we afford to stay?, 42 Far
from whistleblowing, the letter suggests ways that the company can unwind
its problems, without the need to notify investors or regulators of the mas-
sive improprieties going on in the company. She adds: "I am incredibly
nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals. My eight
years of Enron work history will be worth nothing on my resume, the busi-
ness world will consider the past successes as nothing but an elaborate
accounting hoax. 43
Moreover, Watkins clearly identified herself with the management team
that created the scandal, as much as with the Enron investors who were dev-
astated by the collapse of the company. For example, she expresses concern
that unhappy employees were aware of the company's improper accounting
practices and could possibly seek revenge on the company by exposing the
fraud.44 Watkins observes that many shareholders "bought [Enron common
stock] at $70 and $80 a share looking for $120 a share and now they're at
$38 or worse."4 She also observes that she and other employees "are under
too much scrutiny and there are probably one or two disgruntled 'rede-
ployed' employees who know enough about the 'funny' accounting to get us
in trouble. 46
Watkins's letter reveals that she was well aware that the company was
engaged in accounting fraud, and that the financial statements of the com-
pany did not fully represent to investors and regulators the true condition of
the company. For example, Watkins observed, "[W]e have had a lot of smart
people looking at this and a lot of accountants including AA & Co. have
blessed the accounting treatment. None of that will protect Enron if these
transactions are ever disclosed in the bright light of day.
' '7
This suggests that Watkins was not only self-interested, but she also re-
alized that there were material accounting issues that had not been
disclosed. Rather than disclose these issues, she advocated attempting to
correct the problems secretly, which she analogized to "robbing [a] bank in
one year and trying to pay it back two years later."" In other words, the
Watkins letter is more consistent with an effort by Watkins to distance her-
self from the fraud, but to continue to participate in the cover-up, in hopes
that the entire mess would somehow blow over and life could return to nor-
mal.
42. E-mail from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth Lay, Enron Chairman (Jan. 20, 2002),
http://www.itmweb.com/f012002.htm.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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Acting in a manner entirely consistent with the model of rational, self-
interested behavior, Watkins attempts to quantify the risks and rewards of
continuing to mask the company's ongoing fraud by assessing the probabil-
ity of getting caught. She argues that if "[tihe probability of discovery is low
enough and the estimated damage too great; then therefore we [should] find
a way to quietly and quickly reverse, unwind, write down these posi-
tions/transactions. 49 Alternatively, she advises that if "[tihe probability of
discovery is too great, the estimated damages to the company too great ...
we must quantify [and] develop damage containment plans and disclose 0
Her biggest concern is detection. She fears that "[t]oo many people are look-
ing for a smoking gun, 5 ' and she fully understood that Enron was " 'a
crooked company.' ,52
2. Analyzing Sherron Watkins' Actions
The point here is not to vilify Sherron Watkins. Rather, the purpose of
this detailed review of Sherron Watkins's "whistleblowing" is to emphasize
the point that Ms. Watkins did not do anything to expose the ongoing finan-
cial irregularities and accounting fraud. It is doubtful that Ms. Watkins
properly can be characterized as a whistleblower. As I observed earlier, re-
porting fraud to the very people engaged in the misbehavior is hardly
whistleblowing. Even if Ms. Watkins could be thought of as a whistle-
blower, she must be described as an unsuccessful one. This is unsurprising
given that the only person to whom Ms. Watkins directed her whistleblow-
ing was Enron CEO Kenneth Law, who was later convicted of multiple
felonies for misrepresenting Enron's financial condition.
More importantly, regardless of whether Ms. Watkins's activities techni-
cally constitute whistleblowing, it is impossible to describe her motives as
being more altruistic than inside traders. Clearly, there were many motiva-
tions for her actions, including concerns about self-preservation, her
savings, her reputation, and about the undiversified human capital invest-
ment she had made in Enron.
The complexity that characterizes Sherron Watkins's motives is proba-
bly quite typical. Whatever distinctions one might be able to draw between
whistleblowers and inside traders, it is not possible to distinguish these two
activities on the basis of the motives of the actors. Since the activities cannot
be distinguished on the basis of motive, and they cannot be distinguished on
the basis of consequences, one is left to wonder what fuels our intuition that
whistleblowing is desirable while insider trading on the same set of informa-
tion is so abhorrent.53
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Despite the recent surge in popularity, whistleblowers and whistleblowing still face im-
age problems not demonstrably different from the image problems faced by people accused of
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Most, but not all, whistleblowing is tolerated. There is an exception to
the general rule favoring whistleblowing when a whistleblower reveals con-
fidential information that she has a legitimate legal duty not to disclose. But
this, as shown below, is precisely the context in which insider trading is ille-
gal. My point is that, as with whistleblowing, insider trading should be
prohibited only in cases in which whistleblowing is prohibited, that is, in
those cases in which the would-be trader has a legitimate legal duty to keep
the information confidential and otherwise to refrain from acting on the in-
formation.
But, while the legal system ostensibly excoriates inside traders, the law
protects whistleblowers from retaliation by their employers by making it
illegal for any public company to "discharge, demote, suspend, threaten,
harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee" because of
any lawful provision of information about suspected fraud.
54
II. INSIDER TRADING AS WHISTLEBLOWING
Sometimes, insider trading accomplishes precisely the same public
policy objectives as whistleblowing is intended to accomplish. When this
occurs, we should protect insider trading under the venerable common law
doctrine that like cases should be treated alike. In this Part, I demonstrate
that sometimes insider trading is the functional equivalent of
whistleblowing. Such insider trading accomplishes the same goals as
whistleblowing but much more effectively. Such insider trading might be
called "high-powered whistleblowing."
Insider trading involves buying or selling securities (or derivatives, such
as puts, calls, or futures) on the basis of material, nonpublic information."
In this Article, I limit my discussion of insider trading to the narrow context
insider trading. For example, one whistleblower, Jesselyn Radack, a former legal adviser to the
Justice Department's Professional Responsibility Advisory Office, observes being called "traitor,"
"turncoat," and "terrorist sympathizer." Jesselyn Radack, Whistleblowing: My Story, THE NATION,
July 4, 2005, at 8, 24. She was so described after advising the criminal division of the FBI that any
interrogation of "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh outside of the presence of his lawyer would
be unethical. The FBI ignored Radack's advice and interrogated Lindh when he did not have the
benefit of legal counsel. Radack claims a number of e-mails she had written explaining her legal
position determining that Lindh had a right to a lawyer while being interrogated had been destroyed
after the judge in the Lindh case ordered that all the documents be turned over to the court. Radack
then turned whistleblower, disclosing the existence of the missing e-mails to Newsweek. Radack
claims that she believed this was permitted by the Whistleblower Protection Act. Writing about the
incident, Radack observes that "[wihistleblowers are stereotyped as disgruntled employees, trou-
blemakers and snitches. The conscientious employee is often portrayed as vengeful, unstable or out
for attention." Id.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. 1112003).
55. It also is possible to trade shares in rival firms on the basis of material inside informa-
tion. For example, when an employee in a company obtains good (or bad) news about her
company's prospects, she may sell (or buy) shares in rivals, particularly in markets with high levels
of concentrations and barriers to entry. See generally Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Substitutes for
Insider Trading, 54 STFAN. L. REv. 235, 235-294 (2001).
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in which such trading occurs in a situation in which whistleblowing could
also occur. 
6
In this whistleblowing context, insider trading occurs when the potential
whistleblower has bad news about a company. The conduct that replaces the
whistleblowing may involve selling shares short,5 7 selling single-stock
futures contracts, or purchasing put options or selling call options-all
strategies that permit traders to profit on the basis of price declines.
Insider trading on the basis of information about an ongoing fraud
necessarily leads to the exposure of that fraud. It is not profitable for an
inside trader simply to sell or to sell short shares in the company involved in
the fraud without revealing or causing the underlying information to be
revealed. While it might seem that mere selling without disclosure might be
a profitable strategy for insiders because such selling drives share prices
down, this is not the case." In efficient capital markets, 9 transacting in
financial assets, whether buying or selling, will not affect the underlying
values of those assets unless such transactions reveal information. This is
because the prices of securities and other financial assets reflect, at any
given time, all publicly available information relevant to the price of that
asset.6°
Because trades that lack information content will not affect prices,
insiders cannot profit merely by selling-they must also reveal information
for prices to adjust. As with whistleblowing, insider trading on
whistleblower information must result in the information about a fraud
being revealed. If the information turns out to be unreliable, prices will not
56. For a broad defense of insider trading as an efficient mechanism for compensating man-
agement, see HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
57. Short selling occurs when somebody sells shares that she does not own by first borrow-
ing such shares, and delivering them to the purchaser. The short seller must, at some point,
repurchase the shares. The short seller's goal is for the price of the shares being sold to decline so
that they can be repurchased at a lower price, thereby enabling the seller to profit from a decline in
the price of the stock. A short seller's profit is the price at which the stock are sold minus the cost of
buying the shares plus the commissions and expenses (interest) associated with borrowing the stock
until the short position is covered.
58. Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prhibit "Manipulation" in Finan-
cial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 519-21 (1991).
59. The proposition that stock markets are efficient has been formalized in the well-known
"Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis" (ECMH). For a discussion of the ECMH, which posits that a
market is efficient if the prices of the assets traded in that market fully reflect all available informa-
tion relevant to the pricing decision, see JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN
FINANCIAL THEORY 38 (2d ed. 1998); BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL
STREET (8th ed. 2004); and Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Markets Hypothesis and Its Critics, J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 2003, at 59. The semi-strong form of the ECMH posits that current securities
prices "fully reflect public knowledge ... and that efforts to acquire and analyze this knowledge
cannot be expected to produce superior investment results." JAMES H. LORIE, PETER DODD & MARY
HAMILTON KLIMPTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 56 (Myron S. Scholes ed.,
2d ed. 1985).
60. Mere trading does not affect share prices. Rather, trading only affects share prices to the
extent that the trading reveals new information about the returns to investors in the underlying asset.
For example, the available evidence indicates that large block trades adjust rapidly to reflect new
information contained in the sale of the block. Larry Y. Dann et al., Trading Rules, Large Blocks and
the Speed of Adjustment, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1977).
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adjust, and the insider will lose the transaction costs associated with his
investment. These costs can be substantial if the insider is selling short as
well as liquidating his current holdings.6' For this reason, short selling is
likely to be a far more credible signal than whistleblowing: the talk involved
in whistleblowing is cheap, while the trading involved in short selling is
costly to the short seller whose information about the underlying company
is erroneous.
Such short selling can create perverse incentives, particularly the incen-
tive that top managers might have to cause harm to their firms in order to
make private gains on declines in the company's shares. But these perverse
incentives do not pose a problem in cases where insider trading is done by
employees who have no power to affect the strategic decisions of the firm,
either because they no longer are employed by the company or because they
work in a low-level capacity that does not involve strategic decision-making.
For this reason, in my view, regulation should be enacted that permits low-
level insiders such as rank-and-file employees to trade on the basis of mate-
rial, nonpublic information under certain conditions.62
As with whistleblowing, insider trading requires that the person engaged
in the conduct have a pre-existing relationship with the company. In fact,
liability for insider trading requires that there be a pre-existing relationship
63of trust and confidence that the defendant-insider has breached by trading.
To be a whistleblower requires a similar sort of relationship. And, of course,
at a bare minimum, both whistleblowing and insider trading require that the
whistleblowers and the traders actually have some information not generally
known that is of interest to others.
Tying these various strands together, we see that whistleblowers and in-
siders share the same basic defining characteristics: (a) they are
informational intermediaries; (b) they have information not widely known or
not already reflected in share prices; and (c) they are in a pre-existing con-
tractual or quasi-contractual relationship with the source of the
information. 64 As a descriptive matter, the only meaningful difference be-
tween inside traders and whistleblowers is that whistleblowers speak rather
than trade their information. This distinction may appear vast, but, when
61. Short selling is so costly that very few shares are actually sold short. Robert J. Shiller,
From Efficient Markets to Behavioral Finance, J. EcoN. PERSP., Winter 2003, at 83, 101. For exam-
ple, studies show that less than two percent of all stocks had short interest of more than five percent
of outstanding shares. Patricia M. Dechow et al., Short Selling, Fundamental Analysis, and Stock
Returns, 61 J. FIN. EcON. 77, 87 (2001). In addition to the complex tax issues associated with short
selling, traders who sell short must pay daily accruing interest for the shares they borrow in order to
deliver to the purchaser of the shares that have been sold short. Id. at 80. Also, short sellers generally
do not receive interest on the funds received from selling stock short and these funds do not reduce
outstanding margin balances. Id.; see also Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 50,103, 69 Fed.
Reg. 48,008 (Aug. 6, 2004).
62. Such regulation should cover trading by employees who have not had any role in the
underlying conduct on which the trading is based.
63. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
64. See infra Table 1.
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analyzed realistically, it is far from clear that this is a difference with much,
if any, moral significance. And, as shown below, it also is far from clear that
these activities can be distinguished on the basis of their economic impact
on third parties.
A. Dirks v. SEC
The starting point for any analysis of the relationship between whistle-
blowing and insider trading is Dirks v. SEC.6' This case is interesting for two
reasons. First, the case involves the efforts of a failed whistleblower who
passed on tips about company fraud to the defendant. Second, Dirks sug-
gests that whistleblowers and inside traders are likely to have similar
motivations for their behavior. Whether their underlying motivation is re-
venge, profit-seeking, or some complex combination of reasons does not
appear relevant to our analysis of the social desirability of the behavior.
A brief review of the facts: On March 6, 1973, Raymond Dirks, a securi-
ties analyst at the investment bank Hawkins Delafield, received a tip from
Ronald Secrist, a disgruntled former officer of Equity Funding of America.
66
Secrist's tip alleged that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corpora-
tion primarily engaged in selling life insurance and mutual funds, were
vastly overstated as the result of a massive, ongoing series of fraudulent
67
corporate practices. Secrist also told Dirks that he and others had tried to
convey his information about the fraud at Equity Funding to various regula-
tory agencies, including the SEC and the New York State Insurance
Commissioner's Office.6' None of the agencies followed up on these accusa-
tions.69 Secrist urged Dirks to verify the fraud and to disclose it publicly.
70
Secrist did not attempt to blackmail Equity Funding.
At oral argument in the Supreme Court, the SEC took the position that
Dirks's obligation to disclose would not be satisfied by reporting the infor-
mation to the SEC.7' In its brief to the Court, the SEC took an inconsistent
position, speaking favorably of a "safe harbor" rule under which an investor
would satisfy his obligation to disclose by reporting the information to the
Commission and then waiting a set period of time before trading.7" However,
as noted by Justice Blackmun in dissent, since no such safe harbor rule was
65. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
66. Id. at 648-49.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 649, 669 n.2.
69. Id. at 649
70. Id.
71. Id. at 661 n.21 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (No. 82-
276)).
72. Id. at 678 n.17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Respondent at 43-44, Dirks,
463 U.S. 646 (No. 82-276)).
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in effect, "persons such as Dirks have no real option other than to refrain
from trading."73
The prohibition on insider trading was unfortunate in Dirks. If the legal
restrictions against insider trading had been successful in deterring
Raymond Dirks from acting on the tip he had received from Ronald Secrist,
it would have prolonged a massive ongoing fraud. Clearly, prohibiting in-
sider trading would have been inefficient in this context, which is why the
Supreme Court rejected the SEC's legal theory and overturned the Commis-
sion's sanctions against Raymond Dirks.
B. Lessons from Dirks
The Dirks case illustrates that insider trading has at least one clear ad-
vantage over whistleblowing: it provides a significantly more credible signal
the information is true. Talk is cheap. When, as is often the case, the whis-
tleblower is a disgruntled employee, people are less inclined to believe the
whistleblower's story. This is particularly true in a situation like that of
Equity Funding, or Enron, where the corporation is highly regarded and has
significant resources with which to respond to the whistleblower's allega-
tions. In Dirks (and there is no reason to assume that this result should not
be generalized), insider trading worked where whistleblowing did not. The
constellation of facts that produced the litigation in Dirks demonstrates that
insider trading on negative information has certain decisive advantages over
whistleblowing. For instance, insider trading does not require that the per-
son in possession of knowledge of the wrongdoing be able to persuade a
government official to take action before the wrongdoing can be confronted.
The insider need only convince herself that she is right in her own assess-
.74
ment of the situation before acting. This, of course, means that insider
trading on whistleblower information obviates the credibility problem that
typically plagues whistleblowers.
It is true that in the important subset of cases involving government cor-
ruption, whistleblowers can bring their own lawsuits in the form of qui tam
actions. But litigation is costly and time-consuming, and plaintiffs in qui
tam actions must confront the bureaucratic hurdles of court procedure, hur-
dles that need not be confronted by those who simply trade.75 Thus, at least
73. Id.
74. If the insider who trades turns out to be wrong in her belief about the existence of an
ongoing fraud, then she may lose money on her trading. Moreover, like any insider who trades, the
insider who believes she is trading on information about an ongoing fraud has an obligation not to
trade on the basis of legitimate nonpublic information unrelated to any fraud. Thus, in my view,
while it should be permissible for an insider to trade on the basis of information about an ongoing
fraud, it is, and should continue to be, illegal for an insider to trade on the basis of legitimate mate-
rial, nonpublic information such as information about a decline in earnings or a downturn in sales.
75. Under the False Claims Act, the whistleblower first files a lawsuit against the individual
or business association charged with defrauding the government under seal. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)
(2000). Copies of the complaint must be served on the Department of Justice, along with a written
disclosure of all material evidence and information in the whistleblower's possession so that the
Federal Government is able to investigate the claim prior to deciding whether to intervene. Id. The
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in some cases, insider trading has the advantage of involving a faster and
more certain payoff for the insider in possession of whistleblower informa-
tion than whistleblowing does. This is because, unlike whistleblowers,
inside traders do not have to rely on government officials, who are often
poorly motivated or inept, in order to profit from the information they have
acquired. Similarly, unlike whistleblowers, inside traders do not have to wait
for the litigation process to run its course, which may take years to produce
a recovery or settlement.
III. INSIDER TRADING AND WHISTLEBLOWING:
IS THE COMBINATION THE NORM?
Dirks v. SEC, described in the previous section, involved the simultane-
ous use of both whistleblowing and insider trading (via tipping) in a very
effective manner, where effectiveness is measured by the success in reveal-
ing the fraud. The claim that insider trading and whistleblowing are closely
linked is bolstered by the extent to which these activities are conducted si-
multaneously. Insider trading and whistleblowing both require possession of
material, nonpublic information, and both trading and whistleblowing are
consistent with the rational self-interest of the people engaging in these ac-
tivities. Thus it should not be surprising that in cases such as Dirks, these
activities are carried on simultaneously.
For example, Sherron Watkins, who was widely portrayed as a heroine
for calling attention to accounting irregularities at Enron,76 engaged in trad-
ing on the basis of the information contained in her whistleblower
memorandum, and, in doing so, may have violated insider trading laws.77
During her congressional testimony about her role in uncovering the finan-
cial and accounting fraud at Enron, Watkins revealed that soon after warning
Enron CEO Kenneth Lay that the company was about to "implode in a wave
of accounting scandals," she sold a large block of her shares in order to
Department of Justice is then supposed to investigate the case and decide whether to intervene in the
lawsuit. § 3730(b)(3)-(4). While the statute provides for sixty days for the Department of Justice to
make up its mind whether to sue, this period can be and often is extended at the request of the gov-
emnment in the court in which the complaint was filed. Id. If the Government declines to intervene,
the whistleblower may continue to pursue the litigation on her own. § 3730(c)(3). If the Government
decides to intervene, the whistleblower receives a slightly smaller percentage of any recovery: if the
Government intervenes, the whistleblower is entitled to between fifteen to twenty-five percent of the
proceeds of the action or settlement, plus expenses and attorneys' fees. § 3730(d)(1). If the Govern-
ment does not intervene, the whistleblower is entitled to between twenty-five and thirty percent of
the proceeds plus expenses and attorneys' fees. § 3730(d)(2).
76. E.g., Esther Addley, Women: Let's hear it for our women of the year; A totally arbitrary,
personal and partial look at the women who have delighted, impressed and inspired us in 2002,
GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 20, 2002, at 6; Arianna Huffington, If women ran corporate America,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 15, 2003, at B13.
77. See, e.g., Bruce Nichols, Enron witness became pariah: Whistle-blower in case details
response after her meeting with Lay, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 16, 2006, at ID.
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avoid impending losses.78 That sale violated the current interpretation of
SEC Rule lOb-5, the regulation prohibiting insider trading, which makes it
illegal to buy or sell securities "on the basis of material nonpublic informa-
tion about that security," where doing so involves the breach of a pre-
existing duty of trust to maintain the confidentiality of such information.
Of course it is not possible to acquire data on the specific incidences of
insider trading by people with whistleblower information since people trad-
ing on the basis of material, nonpublic information do not advertise their
transactions. However, Sherron Watkins's near incrimination under the laws
prohibiting insider trading is not without precedent.
In addition to the Watkins and the Dirks examples, the classic insider
trading/whistleblower sequence (and even accusations of blackmail) is reit-
erated in the example of Ted Beatty at Dynegy, another Houston energy
company.s Mr. Beatty, angry at Dynegy when he was overlooked for a pro-
motion, resigned from the company. When he left, he took with him
incriminating documents that suggested questionable accounting at the
company in a transaction called Project Alpha. The information revealed by
Mr. Beatty caused several high-ranking Dynegy officers to resign almost
immediately and led to the fraud investigations of energy traders at several
companies. The information also resulted in an SEC suit against Dynegy for
securities fraud. Dynegy ultimately suffered the complete collapse of its
equity and consented to a $3 million SEC civil fine, selling all of its major
81
assets in order to survive.
Following a pattern of conduct virtually identical to the one followed by
Ronald Secrist in the Dirks case, Mr. Beatty tipped his information about
Dynegy to another analyst, Jack Pitts, of the New York investment fund,
Steadfast Capital.82 Steadfast, like Raymond Dirks's clients, sold Dynegy's
stock short.83 Shortly before trading, Mr. Pitts, the tippee, wrote an e-mail to
his tipper, Mr. Beatty, observing that "any sign of dubious accounting at
Dynegy would 'make investors' fears go crazy and take the stock into a tail-
spin.' "84 Again, it was the combination of whistleblowing and insider
trading that led to the exposure of fraud.
78. The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 50 (2002) (testimony of
Sherron Watkins), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/action/107-89.pdf.
79. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b5-1 (2006).
80. See Jathon Sapsford & Paul Beckett, Informer's Odyssey: The Complex Goals and Un-
seen Costs of Whistle-Blowing-Dynegy Ex-Trainee Encounters Short-Sellers and Lawyers, Fears
Being Blackballed-Seeking Justice and a Payday, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2002, at Al.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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IV. CREDIBILITY, PAYOFFS AND RELIANCE ON OTHER MECHANISMS
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The Dirks case and the Beatty incident both illustrate parallels between
insider trading and whistleblowing where the information being used per-
tains to fraud or other corporate misconduct. In both cases, it appears
trading was more successful than whistleblowing in revealing the fraud.
Given the complexity of whistleblowers' motives, their inability to make a
credible commitment about the veracity of their information, and the neces-
sity for bureaucratic investigation of the information being disclosed, it is
not surprising that whistleblowing is often unsuccessful.
An important distinction between whistleblowing and insider trading re-
lates to how each of these activities interacts with other institutions of
corporate governance and informational gatekeepers, particularly Wall
Street industry analysts and the SEC. Whistleblowing, to be effective, re-
quires that other institutions of corporate governance also function
effectively, because whistleblowing is not self-effectuating. Specifically,
unlike inside traders, whistleblowers must first convince regulators, finan-
cial analysts, or some other corporate governance intermediary of the
validity of their claims before their actions can gain traction. Thus, the ef-
fectiveness of whistleblowing largely depends on the integrity and efficacy
of these other institutions. In light of the historical unreliability of institu-
tions of corporate governance, the need to rely on these institutions is a
serious disadvantage for whistleblowing relative to insider trading. Again,
the Dirks case provides a useful illustration of the point.
A. The Failure of External Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Stock market analysts were quite bullish on Equity Funding, the com-
pany whose fraud Ronald Secrist was attempting to reveal. Shortly before
Equity Funding collapsed, an analyst at the investment banking firm Cowen
& Co. issued a report recommending that investors buy Equity Funding "for
aggressive accounts."8" An analyst at Burnham & Co., Inc. opined that Eq-
uity Funding was "an excellent value" and rated the Company "a Buy.
'86
Analysts were not only touting Equity Funding, they also engaged in ac-
tive efforts to defend the stock against Secrist's efforts at whistleblowing.
On March 26, 1973, the day before the New York Stock Exchange halted
trading in Equity Funding, the analyst at Hayden, Stone, Inc. who was re-
sponsible for covering the company circulated a memorandum announcing
that "rumors have been circulating which have affected Equity Funding's
stock., 87 The analyst reported that his well-regarded investment bank had
85. Brian Trumbore, Wall Street History: Ray Dirks and the Equity Funding Scandal,
STOCKSANDNEWS.COM, Feb. 6, 2004, http://www.stocksandnews.com/searchresults.asp?Id=1573
&adate=2/6/2004.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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"checked these rumors, and there appears to be no substance to any of
them. ' It turns out that the analyst "had checked with insurance regulators
in various states and each one said they had no present intention of conduct-
ing any inquiries" into Secrist's allegations of fraud at Equity Funding. 9 The
SEC showed a similar lack of interest in investigating Equity Funding until
investors tipped by Secrist began trading on the information he gave them.
Secrist testified that Equity Funding employees who had attempted to notify
the SEC of the wrongdoing at the company had been "brushed aside with a
comment that that's a ridiculous story."90 Worse still, whistleblowing em-
ployees "also found that the information was sometimes relayed back to
Equity Funding, and that 'they were placed in personal jeopardy as a result
of having gone'" to the SEC.9'
Attempts by Dirks to tip Equity Funding's outside auditors were simi-
larly ineffective. During the course of his investigation of Equity Funding,
Dirks met with the company's auditors "in an attempt to spread word of the
fraud and bring it to a halt."92 When Dirks learned that Equity Funding's
auditors were about to release certified financial statements for the com-
pany, he "contacted them and apprised them of the fraud allegations, hoping
that they would withhold release of their report and seek a halt in the trading
of [Equity Funding] securities." 93 Instead, the auditors "merely reported
Dirks' allegations to ... management." 94
Despite the fact that whistleblowers had contacted the SEC and state in-
surance officials as early as 1971, Equity Funding's chairman-one of the
principal architects of the fraud-testified that, prior to March 1973, when
Secrist's insider trading caused Equity Funding's stock price to collapse, he
had "received no questions from auditors, state regulatory authorities, or
federal regulatory authorities that suggested 'they suspected there was a
fraud at Equity Funding.' ,95
B. The Failure of the Media to Expose Corporate Fraud
Journalists often perform no better than regulators in facilitating the ef-
forts of whistleblowers. In fact the rationale given by the Wall Street Journal
for declining to write a story about the fraud at Equity Funding usefully re-
veals a general problem for journalists seeking to publish information tipped
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646 (1983) (No. 82-276), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/l1982/sg820094.txt.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (alteration in original).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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by whistleblowers: namely, the lack of a means to verify the credibility of
the information being provided by the whistleblower:
[D]uring the entire week that Dirks was in Los Angeles investigating Eq-
uity Funding, he was also in touch regularly with William Blundell, the
Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief. Dirks kept Blundell up to
date on the progress of the investigation and badgered him to write a story
for the Wall Street Journal on the allegations of fraud at Equity Funding.
Blundell, however, was afraid that publishing such damaging rumors sup-
ported only by hearsay from former employees might be libelous, so he
declined to write the story.
[Dirks] provided Blundell with "the substance of all he knew" includ-
ing his "notes" and the "names" of all witnesses. Nevertheless, given the
"scope of the fraud," Blundell doubted that it could have been "missed by
an honest auditor" and discounted the entire allegation.96
C. Whistleblowers' Failure to Communicate
The cautious reactions to information provided by whistleblowers are
not necessarily a result of sloth or venality on the part of regulators, market
analysts, journalists, or others. Rather, the suspicion attached to whistle-
blowers is justified by the dubious motives that often accompany their
actions. For example, Ronald Secrist, the tipper who pointed Raymond
Dirks to the Equity Funding fraud, was reported to have tipped Dirks be-
cause he was "upset over his small Christmas bonus., 9 7 Similarly, Ted
Beatty, the Dynegy tipper, began his whistleblowing because Dynegy failed
to give him "the promotion he felt he deserved." 98
In addition, it is by no means clear that the highly cautious reactions one
often observes in response to whistleblowers' information is a particularly
inefficient response to whistleblowing. In order to gauge the efficiency of
ignoring whistleblowing, one must compare the costs of ignoring the whis-
tleblowing information with the benefits, which come in the form of
conserving resources that otherwise would be wasted in pursuing the false
charges of disgruntled employees and other malcontents. The question of
whether the costs of such caution in response to whistleblowers' complaints
exceed the benefits of investigating the merits of the allegations remains an
empirical issue for which data is scarce if not nonexistent. One thing that is
known, however, is that the cost-benefit calculations associated with ignor-
ing whistleblowers may be different for bureaucrats and financial
intermediaries than for society as a whole. Bureaucrats are inherently risk-
averse. They benefit little from validating a whistleblower's complaint, and
risk a lot if they make a blunder. Thus, bureaucratic incentives may lead to
whistleblowers' claims being met with an excess of caution.
96. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
97. Trumbore, supra note 85.
98. Sapsford & Beckett, supra note 80.
1919June 2007]
Michigan Law Review
Of course, when analysts and other corporate governance intermediaries
have incentives to bias their recommendations and analyses in favor of com-
panies and to ignore fraud, whistleblowers will face even greater obstacles
in trying to convince people that what they are saying is true. As I have
observed in a previous article: "[t]he problem with the analysts' recommen-
dations is not difficult to grasp. Investment banks pressure the analysts they
employ to give positive ratings to companies tracked by issuers because
positive ratings boost stock prices and generate capital for their investment
banking clients."99
Thus gatekeepers such as stock market analysts and bureaucrats have
much to lose and little to gain from crediting whistleblowers' accusations.
D. The Effects of These Failures on Whistleblowing: The Relative
Payoffs of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading
This analysis reveals a major defect with whistleblowing. Besides pro-
viding a more credible signal than whistleblowing, insider trading does not
rely on the efficacy of other institutions of corporate governance in order to
be effective. As these other corporate governance institutions become more
effective, however, the need for whistleblowing also declines. This, in turn,
indicates that whistleblowing is least effective when it is most needed,
which is during times when the basic institutions of corporate governance
are not functioning independently or effectively.
Predictably, the market's response to whistleblowing and insider trading
reflects the higher value associated with trading than whistleblowing. The
Beatty incident at Dynegy and the Dirks case both suggest the monetary
payoff for trading is higher than the payoff for either whistleblowing or tip-
ping, at least in the private sector, where there are no statutes that provide
monetary incentives for whistleblowers. In both cases it appears that the
tippees receiving the information and trading on it fared much better than
the tippers who provided them with the information and attempted to inform
regulators of the problems they had discovered. Mr. Beatty was assured by
the people he approached with his information about Dynegy that his assis-
tance in their trading activities "would earn him big money."' ° Subsequent
press reports of Mr. Beatty's activities, however, reveal that "no such payout
has materialized," and that Mr. Beatty is now "unemployed and in financial
stress."' ' Raymond Dirks became a celebrity. Ironically, his efforts to coop-
erate with the SEC led to his being prosecuted by the SEC for insider
trading.02 If he had confined his activities to tipping, and had not attempted
to inform the SEC of his concerns about Equity Funding, it is likely that he
would have avoided prosecution.
99. Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89
CORNELL L. REv. 394,404 (2004).
100. Sapsford & Beckett, supra note 80.
101. Id.
102. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 650-51 (1983).
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V. INSIDER TRADING, WHISTLEBLOWING, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND LAW
Insider trading can accomplish the same socially desirable results as
whistleblowing. An important difference between insider trading and whis-
tieblowing is that whistleblowing is strictly regulated and constrained by the
need for whistleblowers to have their claims validated by some sort of pub-
lic institution like an administrative agency or a prosecutor. This required
mediation by an outside organization is a controlling mechanism to ostensi-
bly restrict the flow of frivolous or inappropriate whistleblowing. As shown
above, the problem with this process is not so much that it may generate too
many whistleblower complaints, but that it may generate too few, and those
that are generated are sometimes still inappropriately discounted.
A. The Law of Insider Trading and Its Foundations in Property Rights
By contrast, there is no mediating public institution in place to monitor
and control insider trading on whistleblowing information. There are, of
course, legal restrictions on insider trading in place, but these restrictions are
aimed at eliminating insider trading, and do not have the intention of facili-
tating insider trading on whistleblower-type information.
Completely eliminating or even relaxing the rules against insider trading
would predictably result in an oversupply of insider trading. Some mecha-
nism or interpretive rule is needed to distinguish among the various sorts of
inside (material, nonpublic) information, and also to permit market partici-
pants to determine what sort of information may be utilized in trading and
what sort of information must remain confidential.
Current court interpretations of the SEC rules related to insider trading
provide a very promising starting point for developing an interpretive rule
about when insider trading is appropriate in the whistleblowing context.
Here the argument proceeds in three steps. First, the legal prohibition
against insider trading does not bar all trading that occurs when one trader
has an informational advantage over her counterparty. Rather, the rule re-
quires that trading on the basis of such an informational advantage be the
result of a breach of fiduciary duty for it to be illegal.
Second, basing legal responsibility for insider trading on the breach of
fiduciary duty provides a basis for establishing and allocating property
rights in nonpublic information. Information belongs to somebody, usually
the company that is the source of the information. Where trading on this
information involves the misappropriation (or theft) of such information, a
breach of duty occurs. Conversely, trading does not involve the breach of a
duty when the trader is not violating the property rights of any other person
or entity by trading.
Third, applying the above analysis of fiduciary duties and property
rights to trading on the basis of whistleblower information suggests that
there is no basis upon which to ban such trading. Information about an on-
going fraud or other criminal activity should not be considered the property
of the firm that is engaged in the fraud. Trading on the basis of such
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information, therefore, should not be considered a breach of fiduciary duty.
Put simply, while companies clearly have a valid interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of legitimate corporate information, such as their strategic
plans, their earnings, their acquisition plans and other activities, they have
no valid interest in maintaining the confidentiality of information about
fraud or other illegal activities that might be used in whistleblowing.
The rules against insider trading are meant to protect public companies
and investors from theft of information that properly belongs to them. Insid-
ers such as executives or directors, and "temporary insiders" such as
attorneys, accountants, financial printers, and investment bankers routinely
obtain confidential information about a company in the course of their work.
The insider trading rules are intended to prevent both these permanent and
temporary insiders from abusing their positions of trust by trading in viola-
tion of their legal duties of confidentiality.
The Supreme Court clearly articulated the fiduciary underpinnings of in-
sider trading regulations in Chiarella v. United States."" The defendant in
this case, Vincent Chiarella, was a financial printer whose employer,
Pandick Press, was routinely hired by companies seeking to acquire other
companies. These acquirers needed the services of a printer to manufacture
the disclosure documents that would accompany their offers to acquire other
companies. Chiarella traded on the basis of his advance knowledge of the
information contained in the disclosure documents that he was printing. In
so doing, he breached a fiduciary duty not to his trading partners-he owed
no fiduciary duties to them-but rather to the bidding firms that were the
sources of the information and to his employer, both of whom had relied on
Chiarella to keep the information in his possession confidential. In the
Court's view, unless Chiarella had a fiduciary obligation requiring him to
keep the information he had acquired confidential, his trading did not con-
stitute insider trading, despite the fact that he clearly possessed
advantageous, nonpublic information.' °4
B. Legal Lessons for Trading on Whistleblower Information:
Creating Incentives
Here the parallel to whistleblowing is clear. Insider trading is regulated
in order to maintain the confidentiality of legitimate corporate information.
Whistleblowing is encouraged in order to prevent information about fraud
and corruption from remaining confidential. In both the insider trading con-
text and the whistleblowing context, the key issue is the extent to which the
applicable law provides the appropriate incentives. In the case of insider
trading, the focus is on providing incentives for people to maintain the con-
103. 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980).
104. Chiarella clearly breached a fiduciary duty to his employer, Pandick Press, when he
traded on information that he had promised, as a condition of his employment, to keep confidential.
However, because the government had not presented this theory of liability to the jury, the Court
held that Chiarella could not be convicted for trading in breach of a fiduciary relationship of trust
and confidence. Id. at 236-37.
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fidentiality of legitimate corporate information that is meant to be used only
for a corporate purpose and not for the private benefit of inside traders. In
the case of whistleblowing, the focus is on providing incentives for people
to reveal information about wrongdoing.
No rational person would consider the disclosure of some material, non-
public information about a company's strategic plans to be legitimate
whistleblowing. It is, therefore, mysterious why anyone would consider in-
formation about an ongoing corporate fraud to be bona fide corporate
information that a company could legitimately require its employees to keep
confidential. Since it seems irrational to prevent people from disclosing such
information, it also seems irrational to prevent people from trading on the
basis of this sort of whistleblower information.
From a legal perspective, insider trading is illegal only when such trad-
ing is based on material, nonpublic information and the person doing the
trading has breached a fiduciary duty by trading. From a property rights per-
spective, the same inquiries into whether a person owes and has breached
fiduciary duties by trading, define and allocate the nature of the property
interest in the information being exploited through trading. This is because
one cannot owe a fiduciary duty, such as a duty to refrain from trading or to
keep information confidential, unless the person to whom such an obligation
is owed enjoys a property interest in such information.
Consistent with this analysis and going back at least to John Locke, in-
formation acquired through legitimate means, such as one's own labor, is the
property of the person who has acquired it.'05 One has a presumptive fight to
use information acquired in this way.' °6 As Hernando de Soto has powerfully
illustrated, the economic justifications for clearly defining property rights,
as well as for extending such rights to people who have made legitimate
acquisitions, is that doing so provides the best set of incentives to maximize
the value of such information. As Locke was concerned with the underutili-
zation of land enclosed by England's landed gentry, de Soto's concern is
with what he described as "dead" assets, a term he used to describe the un-
disclosed and unregistered assets of those operating outside of the highly
corrupt, overbureaucratized formal economies of undeveloped countries.
1
0
7
The implications are clear: failure to allow insider trading on the basis of
whistleblower information will lead to the same sort of underutilization of
assets as the failure to legalize property rights in underdeveloped sectors of
the world. Just as in the case of ill-defined property rights in de Soto's
105. JOHN LOCKE, TWo TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. H, ch. V, at 285-302 (Peter Laslett
ed., 3d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
106. Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. REV. 337,
375 (1997).
107. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); see also RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM
(1999). For an extremely useful comparison of the work of Locke and de Soto, on which this para-
graph draws, see Donald A. Krueckeberg, The Lessons of John Locke or Hernando de Soto: What if
Your Dreams Come True?, 15 HOUSING PoL'Y DEBATE 1 (2004), available at http://
content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/cache/documents/38182.pdf.
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native Peru, the failure to recognize the rights of people in possession of
corporate whistleblower information to profit from that information will
lead to underutilization of such information and to inefficiency.
Applying this analysis to the legal restrictions on insider trading yields
at least three reasons why certain insiders should be permitted to trade on
whistleblower information. First, insider trading is only illegal when it in-
volves the breach of a fiduciary duty, and there is no fiduciary duty to
maintain the confidentiality of information about an ongoing fraud. Second,
from a property rights perspective, a company committing fraud cannot
claim a legitimate corporate interest in maintaining the ongoing confidenti-
ality of information relating to its fraud. Finally, applying the sort of
economic analysis that de Soto applies in the development context yields the
conclusion that insider trading on whistleblower information should be en-
couraged because, just as it is socially desirable to encourage the efficient
utilization of assets in the economy, it is also efficient to encourage activities
that will not only lead to the exposure of corporate fraud, but also actually
discourage such fraud by raising the probability that it will be exposed.
Still another incentive-based justification for permitting insider trading
on the basis of whistleblower information is that doing so is likely to de-
crease the time required for the information to be revealed to the public.
Insiders may trade knowing that the information they are using will come
out eventually. As long as insider trading is illegal, however, there exists a
powerful disincentive to reveal that they are trading. Legitimizing their
property rights in whistleblower information by making insider trading on
the basis of such information legal would not only have the obvious effect of
encouraging more such trading, but it also would encourage traders to dis-
close or otherwise take steps to make public the information in their
possession. This in turn would accelerate the exposure of the fraud and other
wrongdoing that was the subject of the trading.
C. What Kind of Information Qualifies as Whistleblower Information?
In addition to limiting the identity of who can trade on whistleblower in-
formation, there remains the issue of what sort of information is the proper
subject of trading and what is not. Here the analysis is greatly facilitated
by analogy to protections afforded to corporate whistleblowers by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Sarbanes-Oxley provides protection for information
"regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes
a violation of ... any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders."'08 Thus, just as not every disclosure by self-proclaimed whis-
tleblowers is protected activity, neither should every trade by an insider be
subject to the defense that it involved protected whistleblowing. Neverthe-
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. 11 2003).
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less, the category of protected activity is broad for whistleblowers,'9 and it
should be no less broad for inside traders.
Whistleblower disclosures to nongovernmental agencies including the
news media have long been protected by the Department of Labor under
statutory provisions that are virtually identical to the provisions protecting
whistleblowers in Sarbanes-Oxley." Permitting whistleblowers to commu-
nicate in a slightly different way, by trading, seems like a modest extension
of this current policy.
Sarbanes-Oxley contains protections for whistleblowers who mistakenly
believed that their employers were engaged in illegal conduct. Specifically,
an employee's whistleblower disclosures are protected as long as they are
based on the employee's "reasonable belief' that the employer has engaged
in fraudulent or illegal conduct. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the employee is un-
der no obligation to show that her allegations are meritorious."'
The problem associated with the transmittal of erroneous information
pertaining to a corporation's activities is far less acute in the whistleblower
context than for insider trading for two reasons. First, where an insider en-
gages in trading on the basis of whistleblower information-regardless of
whether that trading consists of short-selling, selling call options or single-
stock futures, or buying put options-the insider must risk her own capital,
betting that there will be a decline in the value of the company's share price
when the whistleblower information is revealed. This means that, regardless
of whether the insider is acting in good faith, it is costly for an insider to
trade on the basis of erroneous information, because doing so involves a
substantial risk that the insider will suffer trading losses. Second, whistle-
blowing involves moral hazard problems that do not exist in the insider
trading context. Specifically, because it is illegal for employers to retaliate
against whistleblowers, employees have an incentive to invent issues about
which they can whistleblow in order to obtain job security that they would
not otherwise have. Employers will be reluctant to fire whistleblowers be-
cause doing this risks not only civil penalties, but criminal sanctions under
section 1107 of Sarbanes-Oxley."'
109. STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW: A GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS
FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES 79 (2004).
110. See Gutierrez, ARB No. 99-116, AU No. 98-ERA-19, 2002 WL 31662915, at * 1-2,4-5
(Dep't of Labor Nov. 13, 2002), also available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/
ARB/DECISIONS/ARBDECISIONS/ERA/99_116A.ERAP.PDF (finding that, in addition to con-
tacting members of Congress, communicating with reporters and a public interest organization,
leading to the whistleblower being quoted in three "prominent" newspapers, was a protected activity
designed to "publicly reveal information" about misconduct).
11l. The standard was articulated in Halloum, ARB No. 04-068, OALJ No. 2003-SOX-0007,
2004 WL 5032613, at *13 (Dep't of Labor Mar. 4, 2004), also available at http://
www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLC/WHISTLEBLOWER/DECISIONS/ALJ_DECISIONS/SOX/O3SOX07A
.HTM ("A belief that an activity was illegal may be reasonable even when subsequent investigation
proves a complainant was entirely wrong. The accuracy or falsity of the allegations is immaterial;
the plain language of the regulations only requires an objectively reasonable belief that shareholders
were being defrauded to trigger the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act's protections.").
112. Section 1107(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley amends 18 U.S.C. § 1513 to provide that: "[w]hoever
knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, including interference
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In addition, Congress, in order to make it "easier for an individual ... to
prove that a whistleblower reprisal has taken place," held that for a whistle-
blower to obtain relief in the form of reinstatement or damages for alleged
retaliation, he need not show that "the whistleblowing was a ... factor in a
personnel action."" 3 Indeed, the whistleblower need not even show that the
whistleblowing was a substantial motivating or predominant factor in any
action taken against him." 4 Instead he need only show a tenuous correlation:
merely showing that the official taking the action knew that whistleblowing
had taken place and acted within a time period after such whistleblowing
that "a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a factor in
the personnel action.""15
The analysis up to this point has demonstrated that there are built-in in-
centives that limit the extent to which people will engage in insider trading
on the basis of erroneous whistleblower information. These safeguards do
not similarly constrain whistleblowers. The analysis also indicates that only
certain information should be the subject of insider trading. This informa-
tion, which is the same information that might assist in an investigation of a
violation of law, is the sort of information which we should encourage whis-
tleblowers to disclose. The fact that we are able to determine the sort of
information that qualifies for whistleblower protection demonstrates that we
can also determine the sort of information that is the proper subject for pro-
tected insider trading.
However, the analysis here does not yield the conclusion that anybody in
possession of material information about an ongoing corporate fraud should
be able to trade on such information. As suggested above, the information
must have been obtained in some legitimate manner. Thus it is necessary, as
Locke puts it, that such property rights be allocated to information and
other assets that are the product of one's "honest industry.""' 6 This suggests
that the right to engage in insider trading on the basis of whistleblower'
information ought not be allocated to people who actually are participating
in the fraud, because those who generate or participate in generating in-
formation about an ongoing fraud have not acquired such information as
the result of their "honest industry," and are not entitled to profit from ex-
ploiting such information."' Similarly, from an economic perspective,
with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law enforcement officer
any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1513
(Supp. 1 2003).
113. 135 CONG. REc. 4508, 4513 (1989).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. LOCKE, supra note 105, at 31 ("[Jlustice gives every man a title to the product of his
honest industry.").
117. In an interview, Dean Henry Manne, when asked about the corporate scandals at Enron
and Global Crossing, indicated that insider trading, if permissible, would have prevented these and
other frauds, saying, "I don't think the scandals would ever have erupted if we had allowed insider
trading ... because there would be plenty of people in those companies who would know exactly
what was going on, and who couldn't resist the temptation to get rich by trading on the information,
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permitting participants in a fraudulent scheme within a corporation to trade
on such information could have the undesirable effect of providing addi-
tional incentives for miscreants to commit fraud.
VI. WHISTLEBLOWERS AND INSIDER TRADING: SOME DIFFERENCES
Whistleblowing and insider trading are complements, not substitutes. A
system that permitted both whistleblowing and insider trading on whistle-
blowing information would do a better job of ferreting out wrongdoing than
a system that permitted only one practice and not the other. The legitimacy
of payments to whistleblowers is well-established and uncontroversial. The
legitimacy of insider trading is, of course, far more contested.
The previous Part stressed certain advantages insider trading has over
whistleblowing. Insider trading is self-effectuating. Inside traders receive
prompt compensation for revealing corporate fraud. By contrast, private
sector whistleblowers are merely protected from retaliation by law. Even in
the public sector, where statutes provide for payments to whistleblowers,
compensation for whistleblowing is highly uncertain and requires the whis-
tleblower wait years, if not decades. Insider trading on whistleblower
information, however, is not without problems of its own. Thus, as discussed
below, insider trading will never replace whistleblowing as a device for
dealing with corporate wrongdoing.
A. The Need for Public Securities Markets
One problem with insider trading as a corporate governance device is
that it is only effective in companies whose shares are publicly traded. There
may be no insider trading opportunities for whistleblowers where the fraud
or wrongdoing discovered by the whistleblower took place in government
agencies or in privately held businesses. However, this shortcoming of in-
sider trading can be easily overstated. First, the observation that it is not
possible to engage in insider trading in agencies and firms with no publicly
traded shares does nothing to undermine the argument that insider trading
on whistleblower information can be of value in revealing fraud in compa-
nies whose shares are publicly traded. Second, drawing from what Ian Ayres
and Joseph Bankman have observed, when insiders cannot trade in their
own company's stock, they may be able to use the information to trade in-
stead in the stock of their firm's rivals, suppliers, customers, or the
manufacturers of complementary products." 8 Ayres and Bankman refer to
this form of trading as trading in stock substitutes. These scholars observe
that trading in stock substitutes may be quite profitable, and Heather Tookes
and the stock market would have reflected those problems months and months earlier than they did
under this cockamamie regulatory system we have." Larry Elder, Commentary, Legalize Insider
Trading?, WASH. IMES, June 15, 2003, http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20030615-112306-
2790r.htm.
118. Ayres and Bankman, supra note 55.
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has shown that insider trading in competitors often is a more profitable trad-
ing strategy for insiders than trading shares in their own firm.
Ayres and Bankman do not consider the possible role of insider trading
as a substitute for whistleblowing. Clarifying the law to permit insider trad-
ing in stock substitutes would dramatically expand the usefulness of insider
trading on whistleblower information. For example, where a municipal
worker has information about fraud in the allocation of construction con-
tracts, she could sell stock in the contractor prior to blowing the whistle.'2
B. The Timing Problem
An additional theoretical problem with insider trading is that the ability
to engage in insider trading on any sort of information, including (but not
limited to) whistleblower information, may create perverse incentives for
the person in possession of the whistleblower information to delay revealing
the information in order to complete her trading. Legalizing insider trading
in material, nonpublic information about corporate fraud, or any other whis-
tleblower information, is inefficient to the extent that such legalization
provides incentives for traders to delay disclosure until the point at which
the information would otherwise be disclosed.1
2
The question of the extent to which such delays would occur is an em-
pirical one for which no data are available. However, while delays in the
disclosure of whistleblower information do represent potential social costs
inherent in the proposed regime, there are significant benefits on the other
side of the ledger that are very likely to outweigh such costs.
Foremost among these advantages is the fact that permitting insider trad-
ing on whistleblower information would lead to the disclosure of
information that otherwise would not be divulged at all. Since complete
nondisclosure of whistleblower information is clearly worse than a mere
delay in disclosure of such information, it is highly probable that the bene-
fits of permitting insider trading on the basis of whistleblower information
outweigh the costs.
Even if there is a delay in disclosure while insiders trade, this delay must
be evaluated in light of the fact that there also is an inevitable delay in dis-
closure whenever a whistleblower engages in whistleblowing without
concomitantly engaging in insider trading. Moreover, as described in more
detail below, insider trading tends to push prices in the "correct" direction
119. Heather Tookes, Information, Trading and Product Market Interactions: Cross-Sectional
Implications of Insider Trading (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
120. Clearly it should be illegal for a government official involved in the investigation or
prosecution of activity, either in the public sector or the private sector, to engage in any sort of trad-
ing on the basis of that information. The ability to engage in such trading would present a profound
moral hazard, as the government official would have incentives to bring cases against innocent
companies in order to benefit from stock price movements around the time of the announcement of
contemplated regulatory action.
121. Henry Manne has suggested there is no problem here because insider trading enables
investors to receive "virtual" full disclosure in the form of immediate and correct price adjustments.
See Henry G. Manne, The Case for Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2003, at A14.
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even before the revelatory disclosures are made. In contrast, when whistle-
blowing occurs unaccompanied by trading, there may be no change in share
values prior to the public disclosure of information.
VII. WHO PAYS FOR WHISTLEBLOWING AND INSIDER TRADING:
FAIRNESS WORRIES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES
The above discussion presented an analysis that favored allowing insider
trading on the basis of whistleblower information from instrumentalist and
efficiency perspectives. Insider trading also raises important distributional
concerns. In particular, at first blush it might appear that one advantage
whistleblowing has over insider trading is that, since its impact is distributed
more evenly over a corporation's population of shareholders, it is more
"fair" than insider trading.
A. Fairness
At the outset, I wish to emphasize that no claim is being made here that
those who trade on the basis of an informational advantage are particularly
virtuous. These folks are not heroes. No claim is made that they are. Rather,
the claim is simply that those who trade on the basis of inside information
about an ongoing corporate fraud cannot be said categorically to be morally
inferior to someone like Sherron Watkins who engages in self-serving whis-
tleblowing. This, of course, is not because those who engage in insider
trading are commendable, but rather because those who engage in whistle-
blowing are not. Nevertheless, it is far from clear that insider trading of the
sort described here should be banned on fairness grounds. 12
It is important to recognize at the outset that the traders being discussed
here deserve to be able to sell their shares ahead of other shareholders. From
a fairness perspective, perhaps the best way to conceptualize the issue is by
analogizing the shareholders in a company riddled with fraud to the ethical
dilemma that confronts the crew of a sinking ship with a grossly insufficient
supply of life rafts. Selling shareholders are a bit like crew members who
learn about a crisis on board ship in the course of their duties some time
before their fellow passengers. Should the crew members be able to use this
information to save themselves by securing a place on a life raft before the
passengers?
122. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that legal policy analysis should be guided by
reference to the well-being of individuals, and that legal rules should not guided by notions of fair-
ness except to the extent that these fairness notions affect individuals' well-being. Louis KAPLOW &
STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 27 (2002). Of course, under this approach, one need
not address the issues of fairness raised by analytical devices such as Kant's categorical imperative
or the veil-of-ignorance construct. Under the Kaplow-Shavell approach, insider trading of the kind I
describe in this Article should be encouraged because it unambiguously leads to improvements in
the welfare of individuals. However, in this portion of the Article my aim is to show that insider
trading of the kind I describe is best characterized as "fair" in Kantian or Rawlsean terms as well as
"efficient" in Pareto terms.
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Focusing on the differences between the employees (crew) and the out-
side investors (passengers) suggests that in the corporate context, the answer
to this question generally will be yes. This is because, unlike outside inves-
tors, the rank-and-file employees are unable to diversify their investments in
the companies in which they work, and thus they suffer disproportionately
from the effects of major corporate scandals. In particular, workers, unlike
outside investors, have undiversifiable investments in their own human capi-
tal. Trading on the basis of inside information related to an ongoing
corporate fraud that is going to destroy the company at least permits an em-
ployee to recoup some of this lost investment.
When corporations like Cendant, Enron, and Equity Funding implode,
the rank-and-file workers are often the hardest hit. When Enron filed for
bankruptcy protection, more than 4500 workers lost their jobs.23 In the fall
of 2001, as the problems at Enron gradually revealed themselves, "the com-
pany swiftly collapsed, taking with it the fortunes and retirement savings of
thousands of employees."' 24 The Enron rank-and-file employees have had a
very difficult time securing comparable employment elsewhere, even years
after the collapse of the company. 25 In contrast with the executives at the
top, who participated in the fraud and made millions, "most former Enron
employees who had nothing to do with the fraud at the company," have not
fared well at all.
2 6
Like 25.6% of companies with 5000 or more employees, most (sixty
percent) 27 of Enron employees had their retirement money as undiversified
123. Kristen Hays, Midlevel Enron Corp. Executive Pleads Guilty to Filing False Fax
Return, ABILENE REPORTER-NEws, Nov. 27, 2002, http://www.texnews.com1998/2002/texas/
texasMidlevell 127.html.
124. Simon Romero, 10 Enron Players: Where They Landed After the Fall, N.Y TIMES, Jan.
29, 2006, at 9.
125. Simon Romero, Hard limes Haunt Enron's Ex-Workers; Few Find Jobs of Equal Stature
Years After Company's Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2006, at 1.
126. Id.
127. Ari Weinberg, The Post-Enron 401(k), FORBES.COM, Oct. 20, 2003, http:l/
www.forbes.con2003/10/20/cx aw-1020retirement.html. Enron had 11,000 employees in its
401(k) plan. See Michael W. Lynch, Enron's 401(k) Calamity, REASON ONLINE, Dec. 27, 2001,
http://www.reason.com/ml/ml122701.shtml (noting that "[iun early 2001, Enron decided to contract
out its 401(k) administration to an outside company"). This transfer required that Enron's 401(k)
accounts be frozen. Thus, for a certain period of time in October and November 2001 employees
could not move their retirement funds out of Enron stock. There is a dispute about whether the ac-
counts were frozen for twelve trading days, (from October 26, 2001 through November 12, 2001),
as the Company claims, or for a longer period. One employee has alleged that his account was fro-
zen on September 26, 2001. A separate law suit alleges that accounts were frozen beginning on
October 17, 2001. The period when the accounts were frozen, whatever the precise dates actually
were, was a time of extreme upheaval at Enron. On October 16, 2001, the Company announced that
it had to take a $1.1 billion charge for bad investments. On October 22, the SEC announced an in-
formal investigation into Enron's accounting practices. On October 29, Moody's downgraded its
ratings of Enron's debt. On October 31, the SEC announced that its investigation was formal. On
November 8, Enron restated its financial results for every year since 1997. On October 26, 2001, the
day Enron claims it froze its 401(k) accounts, its stock was trading at $13.81 per share. By the time
401 (k) investors could sell again, the stock was at $9.98. Id.
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investments in Enron stock, ' despite the fact that these employees had
other alternatives. 21 "Enron, like many other public companies, matched
pretax 401(k) contributions with its own stock and limited the ability of em-
ployees to sell that stock."'3 ° Given the undiversified nature of employees'
investment in Enron stock, and the inability of Enron employees to diver-
sify, it does not appear to be unfair to permit these employees to sell and to
sell short when in possession of material, nonpublic information about their
company. Other investors can avoid the firm-specific risk of an implosion at
Enron by holding a diversified portfolio of securities. Workers cannot avoid
this risk. The only way for them to mitigate the risk is by trading on the ba-
sis of inside information.
Permitting certain rank-and-file insiders to trade on the basis of their in-
formational advantage about the ongoing fraud at Enron would be entirely
fair. Workers are at a disadvantage relative to other shareholders because
they are unable to diversify their human capital investment in the companies
they work for. Rules enabling these people to trade would be consistent with
Rawls's idea that resources ought to be arranged so that they inure "to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged."' 3 ' This suggests that Rawls could
endorse precisely the sort of involuntary disadvantage that results from in-
sider trading when such disadvantage benefits the worst-off.
Rawls's veil of ignorance generates the same conclusion about the fair-
ness of insider trading. To generate principles of justice, Rawls suggests that
we imagine what rules of social ordering rational, self-interested people
would choose from behind a veil of ignorance. Rational shareholders in
large public companies would agree ex ante to permit innocent insiders to
trade on the basis of whistleblower information because these insiders can-
not diversify in any other way. Self-interested investors also would agree to
permit this sort of insider trading because it reduces the probability that
fraud will occur by increasing the probability that such fraud would be
found out.
It is undeniable that insider trading, by definition, involves unequal
treatment. To the extent that fairness is defined as equal outcomes, then the
insider trading I describe, along with all other trading, would be banned.
More troubling is the fact that the trading I describe also involves inequality
of opportunity, because the insiders have access to whistleblower informa-
tion that is not available to their trading partners. However, as Frank
128. See generally Corey Rosen, Questions and Answers About Enron, 401(k)s, and ESOPs,
THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, Jan. 2002, http://www.nceo.org/library/
enron.html.
129. See Enron and Beyond: Enhancing Worker Retirement Security: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Education and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 12 (2002) (statement of Douglas Kruse,
Ph.D., Professor, School of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University) ("Most partici-
pants, interestingly, in ESOPs and other employer stock plans are in companies that also maintain
diversified pension plans.").
130. Weinberg, supra note 127.
131. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83 (1971); see also Daniel Markovits, How Much
Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J. 2291, 2326-29 (2003).
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Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel ably have explained, in the corporate con-
text at least, fairness does not mean equal treatment because fairness and
equality are not the same thing. 2 Fairness, for investors, requires the pursuit
of policies that maximize the value of investments ex ante.'33 Easterbrook
and Fischel illustrate the point as follows: given a choice between two ven-
tures, one that provides a payoff of $10 to every one of a firm's ten
investors, and one that provides a payoff of $40 to five of the ten investors
but nothing to the remaining five, a firm's board should choose the latter
venture. This is because the total expected (ex ante) return from the latter
investment is $200, while the expected return from the former investment is
only $100. As Easterbrook and Fischel observe, if unequal distribution is
necessary to make the overall returns higher, then the company is required
to choose inequality. ' 4 This illustration maps perfectly onto the whistle-
blower issue. Barring insider trading on whistleblower information would
eliminate the inequality that results from the insider's trading on an informa-
tional advantage, but it also would eliminate the substantial gains to all
investors associated with the ex ante reduction in the incidence of fraud.
Thus, because shareholders "unanimously prefer legal rules under which the
amount of gains is maximized, regardless of how the gains are distrib-
uted,"'35 insider trading on the basis of whistleblower information is fair to
investors under any coherent notion of the meaning of the term "fair."
Finally, with respect to fairness, I hasten to acknowledge that the "pure"
whistleblower (should such a thing exist) is a Good Samaritan. 116 Insiders,
on the other hand, decidedly cannot be described as Good Samaritans. Nev-
ertheless, nobody has ever seriously suggested that one is legally required to
be a Good Samaritan. The issue, in other words, is not whether insider trad-
ing on whistleblower information should be applauded; the issue is whether
the conduct should be considered criminal. At a minimum, this decision
should be left to investors themselves, who, after full disclosure, should be
allowed to decide for themselves whether they want to invest in a public
company that permits insider trading on the basis of whistleblower informa-
tion.
B. Distributional Concerns
Intuitively, whistleblowers' impact is uniform across all shareholders,
while insiders' trading differentially affects those (buying) shareholders who
are unfortunate enough to be the counterparties of the insiders who are sell-
132. FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAw 110 (1991).
133. See id.
134. Id. at 111.
135. Id. at 124.
136. See generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 62
(1971) (defining a Good Samaritan as someone who goes "out of his way, at some cost to himself,
to help").
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ing on whistleblower information. However, this intuition is wrong because
it falsely assumes that those trading with insiders in possession of whistle-
blower information are harmed. In fact, the outsiders who are the
whistleblower information traders' counterparties likely benefit from the
insider trading here. This is because selling by insiders in possession of
whistleblower information will, to the extent that it has any effect at all on
share prices, drive down those prices, thereby benefiting their counterparties
by driving down their acquisition costs.
The downward pressure on share prices caused by insider trading will
benefit ordinary investors, whom I define as investors who do not purport to
trade on information not already impounded in share prices, but instead buy
and sell shares either to adjust their portfolios or because of changes in pat-
terns of consumption and investment over their life cycle. The critical point
here is that such traders are not induced by insider selling to buy: they
would have bought anyway. As such, they are made better off, not worse off,
by any informed sales by insiders because such sales drive down the price at
which the insiders' counterparties are able to buy. The effect of insider trad-
ing on true outsiders just described is depicted in the chart below.
The assumption is that, all else being equal, in the absence of any prohi-
bition on insider trading there will be more such trading than there would be
otherwise. This greater incidence of insider trading would cause share prices
to fall more precipitously than they would fall otherwise. Alternatively, if
enforcement of the law is "perfect" in the sense that all inside traders are
caught and punished, there will be no such trading, and share prices will
adjust only when the fraud or other corporate misconduct that is the subject
of the whistleblowing is revealed to the public, at which time there will be a
dramatic drop in share prices. Finally, where there are prohibitions on in-
sider trading on the basis of whistleblower information, but those
prohibitions are imperfectly enforced, share prices will respond to insider
trading, but less dramatically than they would respond if such trading were
condoned.
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DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
ABOUT CORPORATE MISCONDUCT
price.
$50/share
$00.25/share
Perfect enforcement.
As depicted in the graph, because share prices fall most dramatically
when insider trading is permitted, this is the legal regime that most benefits
buyers. It is also clear that people who trade prior to the commencement of
the fraud are not affected. And, of course, people who trade after the fraud is
announced are similarly unaffected by the insiders' trading.
The above discussion of the distributional effects of insider trading on
whistleblower information is incomplete because it ignores the real possibil-
ity that if insider trading on whistleblower information were permitted, then
insiders might delay exposing an ongoing fraud in order to allow themselves
time to trade on such information. This possibility, as noted above, also af-
fects the analysis of the efficiency characteristics of trading on
whistleblower information. However, from a distributional perspective, it is
by no means clear that a delay in revealing an ongoing fraud or other corpo-
rate misconduct hurts a company's existing shareholders. Rather, such
shareholders benefit as long as the conduct goes undetected, because as long
as this is the case, share prices remain high. Shareholders who manage to
use any extra time to sell their shares clearly benefit.
It is also the case that if insider trading is illegal and the only avenues
that insiders have for dealing with fraud or corporate misconduct are black-
mail and whistleblowing, the delay in the release of information about
corporate misconduct is likely to be even longer than it will be if insiders are
permitted to trade. Most importantly, from both an efficiency standpoint and
a distributional standpoint, insider trading on whistleblower information is
likely to lead to less corporate misconduct because the possibility that such
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insider trading will occur increases the probability that corporate fraud will
be detected, thereby leading to a reduction in the incidence of such fraud.
This reduction in fraud makes all shareholders better off, whether
viewed from a distributional perspective or an efficiency perspective. Thus,
while there is some ambiguity about the distributional effects of insider trad-
ing on whistleblower information, the argument that insider trading has
distributional benefits for true outsiders, which is the class of shareholders
thought most deserving of protections, is quite compelling.
VIII. WHISTLEBLOWING AND INSIDER TRADING: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND CONTRACTING ISSUES
Whistleblowing has long been encouraged as a means to reduce the in-
cidence of fraud against the government. At common law, insider trading
was tolerated: managers and other insiders were permitted to trade on the
basis of nonpublic information unless specifically forbidden to do so by
contract. 3 7 Corporate charters are silent both on the issue of insider trad-
ing 38 and on the issue of whistleblowing. This is surprising on both
counts-it is surprising that corporate charters do not bar trading on inside
information, and it also is surprising that corporate charters do not encour-
age whistleblowing by offering monetary rewards to whistleblowers like the
ones provided for in federal whistleblower statues such as the False Claims
Act.
The foregoing analysis, however, explains both of these phenomena. As
for insider trading, the analysis here suggests it is not in shareholders' inter-
ests to bar all sorts of insider trading. Insider trading on whistleblower
information should not be banned: it should be encouraged. On the other
hand, where insider trading involves the misappropriation of information
that is the property of shareholders or the company itself, insider trading
must be banned, as is the case where there is insider trading in advance of
the announcement of a tender offer or of corporate earnings. Suppose for
example that a corporate officer accepts a bribe in exchange for information
that a company was about to repurchase a large block of its own shares at a
premium above the current market price. This information is then used by
the person paying the bribe to purchase stock in the company, thereby driv-
ing up the price that the company must pay to acquire its own shares. 3 9 This
137. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933); Todd A. Bauman, Comment, Insider
Trading at Common Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 838 (1984).
138. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 857 (1983) (noting that corporate charters do not prevent insider trading).
139. Cf FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 573 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1987), modified, 852 F.2d 981 (7th
Cir. 1988), remanded to 727 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. I11. 1989) (addressing a corporation suing an arbi-
trageur for insider trading on information about a corporate recapitalization that would distribute
cash to shareholders in exchange for reducing their equity stakes in the company in order to give
managers a larger share of the corporation's equity, on the theory that the corporation had to pay
more to acquire the shareholders' equity because insider trading drove up the price of the company's
shares).
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sequence of events involves the theft of valuable information that is in the
nature of a property right.
Current law permits insider trading when, and only when, such trading
is consistent with traders' fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the com-
pany. Fiduciary duties are the mechanism employed by the law to identify
and allocate property rights in the information that provides the basis for
trading. Fiduciary duties therefore replace contractual rules where contract-
ing is too costly. Since insider trading can arise in a widely divergent set of
circumstances, and because corporations and their agents do not have per-
fect foresight and thus are unable to anticipate all future situations in which
insider trading might occur, it would be extremely costly to draft a corporate
contract that specified with precision what sorts of trading are banned. So
instead of trying to specify ex ante every possible situation in which insider
trading should be banned, we have a rule that prohibits trading that involves
breaches of fiduciary duties and theft of intellectual property.
The "contracting cost" explanation of why we do not observe provisions
in corporate charters or bylaws barring insider trading does not explain why
we do not observe provisions in corporate contracts that specifically permit
whistleblowing, provide protections, and authorize monetary rewards for
whistleblowers. One possibility is that venal and corrupt corporate managers
prevent these sorts of charter provisions from being implemented because
they want to discourage whistleblowers from revealing their illegal acts.
This explanation is highly unlikely for two reasons. First, while it is un-
doubtedly the case that there are a few corporate managers who are
dishonest, there are many more who are honest. Such managers would be
able to signal their integrity by providing job security and bounties for whis-
tleblowers. Thus, it might not be surprising that some firms decide not to
provide such protections, but it is quite curious that none did until Sarbanes-
Oxley required them to do so.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 contains two sets of provisions ad-
dressing issues involving corporate whistleblowers. One set of provisions
are the whistleblower procedures mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley section 301,
which requires audit committees to establish internal whistleblowing proce-
dures pursuant to Securities Exchange Act Rule 1OA-3.' 4 The second set of
provisions is contained in Sarbanes-Oxley section 806, which adds a pano-
ply of whistleblower protections to Title 18 of the U.S. Code. 4 ,
Rule 10A-3 of the Exchange Act requires the New York Stock Ex-
change, NASDAQ, and other stock market self-regulatory organizations to
compel the audit committees of listed companies to establish formal proce-
dures for responding to whistleblowers' complaints regarding accounting
and auditing issues. 4 2 Audit committees must establish procedures for deal-
ing with both external complaints from any sources and internal complaints
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. III 2003).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. Ii 2003).
142. 17 C.ER. 240.1OA-3 (2006).
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from employees. Companies must provide a mechanism for receiving and
processing confidential, anonymous submissions by employees of concerns
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.
Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley establishes safeguards for employee
whistleblowers who report certain sorts of corporate misconduct. Section
806 provides protections for any employee who either: (a) files, testifies,
participates in, or otherwise assists in any proceeding relating to an alleged
violation of the mail, wire, bank, or securities laws; or (b) provides informa-
tion or assists in an investigation regarding any conduct that the employee
"reasonably believes" constitutes a violation of the mail, wire, bank, or se-
curities laws. 43 Employees are protected by section 806 if they report
information to a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, any member
or committee of Congress, any person with supervisory authority over the
employee, or any other person who has "the authority to investigate, dis-
cover, or terminate misconduct."'"4 Additionally, section 806 prevents
employees who file complaints with the secretary of labor from being dis-
charged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or discriminated against
as a result of that involvement. 145 Civil remedies for violations of section 806
include reinstatement, back pay with interest, and attorneys' fees.
46
Second, it is curious why firms emerging from bankruptcy, firms going
public for the first time, or firms whose original financing came from ven-
ture capitalists did not try to improve their access to the capital markets and
the terms of their initial financing by introducing whistleblower protections
such as the ones contained in Sarbanes-Oxley. In all likelihood, such provi-
sions were not adopted by companies because they do not enhance
shareholder welfare. It would be an exaggeration to say that providing pro-
tections for whistleblowers is devoid of benefits. Rather, the point is simply
that it appears likely that companies generally decide on their own not to
provide for protections for whistleblowers because the cost of maintaining
such provisions outweighs the benefit.
One significant cost of installing whistleblower protections of the kind
described in Sarbanes-Oxley is the cost of evaluating a whistleblower com-
plaint. Particularly where bounties are involved, as noted above, there are
likely to be several false complaints for every valid one. The risk of receiv-
ing false complaints is compounded when one takes into account the fact
that disgruntled former employees, especially those who have been termi-
nated, are likely to bring whistleblower complaints in order to try to obtain
reinstatement and/or back pay.141 It is also likely that terminated employees
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. 11 2003).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. The problem of distinguishing among whistleblower complaints is likely exacerbated by
the fact hat whistleblowers often are mavericks who may have personality conflicts with supervi-
sors anyway.
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will attempt to extract a measure of revenge on former supervisors, particu-
larly those responsible for the employees' termination.
4
Evidence of concern about false whistleblower complaints is contained
in the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself, which requires OSHA to
dismiss any whistleblower complaint without conducting an investigation
unless the complainant can make a "prima facie showing" that his or her
whistleblowing activities constituted at least "a contributing factor" in any
alleged unfavorable personnel action. Even if the complainant succeeds in
making this prima facie showing, Sarbanes-Oxley does not permit OSHA to
investigate a whistleblower's complaint "if the employer demonstrates, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the employer would have taken the same
unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior."
The high costs of investigating a whistleblower's complaints and the
problems of false and retaliatory complaints, coupled with what may, in
fact, be a low incidence of corporate fraud, make it likely that the costs of
whistleblower provisions outweigh the benefits. These costs appear to be the
best explanation for why companies did not adopt whistleblower protections
such as the ones mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley before they were required to
do so by statute.
IX. WHISTLEBLOWING AND INSIDER TRADING ARE NOT BLACKMAIL
Like whistleblowing and insider trading, requests for blackmail pay-
ments reflect an effort to traffic in intellectual property. In particular, in all
three cases, there is information that somebody wants to conceal and some-
body else wants to bring to the light of day. Scholars have gone to great
lengths to try to explain the harm in blackmail. 49 My goal here is not to add
to the existing theories of how blackmail is different from or similar to other
crimes. The primary reason that blackmail has posed such an analytical
problem for scholars is because it involves the combination of two acts:
threatening to reveal a secret and demanding money (presumably) to keep
the secret, neither of which, standing alone, is illegal. 50 Rather my point is
simply that blackmail does not share the benign, welfare-enhancing charac-
teristics that link insider trading and whistleblowing. In particular, whereas
whistleblowing and insider trading inevitably lead to the discovery and ex-
posure of pathological behavior, the payment and acceptance of blackmail
lead to the continued concealment of the unacceptable behavior. This sug-
gests that blackmail is a less desirable practice than either insider trading or
148. Thus it is not surprising that whistleblowers are viewed with some moral ambiguity: "To
some, whistle blowing is considered to be an ultimate expression of accountability. To others, whis-
tle blowing is the spiteful behavior of disgruntled employees and an act of organizational
disloyalty." AM. Soc'Y FOR PUB. ADMIN., POSITION STATEMENT ON WHISTLE BLOWING (1979),
http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/coe/amer.soc.public.admin.a.html.
149. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 241 U. PA. L. REV. 1935 (1993);
James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (1984); Henry E.
Smith, The Harm in Blackmail, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 861 (1998).
150. Glanville L. Williams, Blackmail, 1954 CRiM. L. REv. (Eng.) 79, 163.
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whistleblowing. While insider trading and effective whistleblowing lead to
the exposure of wrongdoing, successful blackmail leads to the continued
cover-up of wrongdoing.
5
'
Blackmailers are accurately perceived as sleazy and corrupt. Their con-
duct is clearly illegal. By contrast, whistleblowers are occasionally viewed
as brave and altruistic, and inside traders, while viewed somewhat more am-
bivalently than whistleblowers, seem to hold a position in the moral order
somewhere between blackmailers and whistleblowers.
CONCLUSION
Insiders who know or suspect corporate wrongdoing can respond in one
of three ways: by whistleblowing, by insider trading, or by blackmailing the
wrongdoers. This Article has advanced the argument that insider trading on
the basis of information about corporate wrongdoing is more like whistle-
blowing than it is like blackmail. Unlike blackmail, in order for insider
trading on information concerning corporate misconduct to be successful,
the information that underlies such trading must be revealed or else the
share price of the company engaged in the wrongdoing will not fall and the
insider will not profit. By contrast, a successful blackmail strategy will re-
sult in a payoff to the blackmailer that will keep the information quiet
forever. Thus, insider trading on whistleblower information, like whistle-
blowing itself, results in the release of information about corporate
misconduct.
The argument here is not that all insider trading should be condoned. In
fact the opposite is true. The analysis here applies only to a very narrow
subset of inside information-information about corporate misconduct that
would be the proper cause for whistleblowing. Trading on nonpublic infor-
mation about legitimate corporate news, whether the news is good or bad, is
and should be illegal. The prohibition of this sort of insider trading is effi-
cient because it protects valuable property rights in information. By
contrast, corporations and corporate miscreants have no legitimate property-
based expectation in keeping information about an ongoing misconduct con-
fidential. Permitting insider trading on the basis of such information would,
in a variety of contexts, provide the strongest incentives for people to seek
out and expose such corporate wrongdoing.
151. This is not to say that blackmail involves only costs and no benefits. To the extent that
the possibility of blackmail deters the undesirable conduct that is the subject of the blackmail, there
are benefits. The social costs of blackmail, however, clearly outweigh the private benefits to the
blackmail contract.
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TABLE I
DEFINITION WHISTLEBLOWING INSIDER BLACKMAIL
TRADING
Pre-existing contractual or quasi- Yes Yes No
contractual relationship of trust/
confidence
Trading/Whistling/Blackmail No No No
demand involves breach of duty
Information becomes reflected in Yes Yes No
securities prices
Motivations of actor Highly Varied Highly Venal
Varied
Informational intermediaries Yes Yes No
Actions impose distributional Yes Yes No
harm
Actions lead to corrective Yes Yes No
measures
De minimis problem No Yes Yes
Verification problem Yes No Yes
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